Abstract. After a series of works on RC4 cryptanalysis in last few years (published in flagship cryptology conferences and journals), the most significant (and also very recent) attack on the cipher has been the discovery of vulnerabilities in the SSL/TLS protocol, by AlFardan, Bernstein, Paterson, Poettering and Schuldt. They ran extensive computations to identify significant short-term single-byte keystream biases of RC4, and utilized that knowledge in the attack. The biases identified by AlFardan et al. consist of earlier known biases of RC4, as well as some newly discovered ones.
Introduction
Over the last three decades of research in stream ciphers, several designs have been proposed and analyzed by the community. The RC4 stream cipher, 'allegedly' designed by Rivest in 1987, has sustained to be one of the most popular ciphers in this category for more than 25 years. The cipher has continued gaining its fabled popularity for its intriguing simplicity that has made it widely accepted in the community for various software and web applications.
The cipher consists of two major components, the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) and the Pseudo-Random Generation Algorithm (PRGA). The internal permutation of RC4 is of N bytes, and so is the key K. The original secret key is of length typically between 5 to 32 bytes, and is repeated to form the final key K. The KSA produces the initial permutation of RC4 by scrambling an identity permutation using key K. The initial permutation S produced by the KSA acts as an input to the next procedure PRGA that generates the output keystream, as shown in Fig. 1 .
Notation. For round r ≥ 1 of RC4 PRGA, we denote the indices by i r , j r , the output byte by Z r , the index location of output Z r as t r , and the permutations before and after the swap by S r−1 and S r respectively. Thus, round r of RC4 PRGA is defined by i r = i r−1 + 1, j r = j r−1 + S r−1 [i r ], swap S r−1 [i r ] ↔ S r−1 [j r ], t r = S r [i r ] + S r [j r ], and Z r = S r [t r ]. After r ≥ 1 rounds of KSA, we denote the state variables by adding a superscript K to each variable. By S K 0 and S 0 , we denote the initial permutations before KSA and PRGA respectively. Note that S K 0 is the identity permutation and S 0 = S K N is the permutation obtained right after the completion of KSA. Throughout this paper, all operations in context of RC4 are to be considered 'modulo N '. 
Motivation of our work
In a recent paper [24] at FSE 2013, Sepehrdad, Susil, Vaudenay, and Vuagnoux have rightly claimed:
For some people, attacking WEP is like beating a dead horse, but this horse is still running wildly in many countries all over the world. Also, some companies are selling hardware using modified versions of the WEP protocol, they claim to be secure.
IEEE WiFi security protocol WEP is based on the stream cipher RC4, and hence the same statement applies to RC4 as well. The history of RC4 cryptanalysis is more than 20 years old. However, in recent times, there is a renewed surge of interest in RC4 cryptanalysis in the cryptographic community. For example, significant cryptanalytic results on WEP and WPA have been published in Eurocrypt 2011 by Sepehrdad, Vaudenay, and Vuagnoux [26] . In only the first quarter of the current year (2013), RC4 has attracted 10 publications [1, 6, 8-10, 17, 20, 22, 24, 27] . In spite of this, many problems are still open and the cipher is not yet broken.
As a stream cipher, RC4 promises to deliver pseudo-random bytes as keystream output. Thus, any lapse in that goal creates interesting consequences towards the security of the cipher. This is the reason why statistical weaknesses like biases and their application as distinguishers have attracted the main focus of RC4 cryptanalysis to date. There have been numerous results on RC4 biases over years, and the trend still continues.
Most of the existing results are targeted towards specific short-term (involving only the initial few bytes of the output) biases and correlations [1, [5] [6] [7] 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26] , while there exist only a few important results for long-term (prominent even after discarding an arbitrary number of initial bytes of the output) biases [2, 4, 5, 7, 12, 14] .
In this paper, we concentrate on the short-term traits of non-random behavior in the initial keystream bytes of RC4, especially in the first N output bytes. The prominent results on the short-term biases of RC4 include Mantin and Shamir second byte bias [15] , Mironov first byte sinecurve-like distribution [16] , Maitra, Paul and Sen Gupta short-term biases towards zero [11] , Sen Gupta, Maitra, Paul and Sarkar proof of first byte bias [22] , Sarkar second byte negative bias [20] , Isobe, Ohigashi, Watanabe and Morii full broadcast attack [6] , and the most recent results by AlFardan, Bernstein, Paterson, Poettering and Schuldt [1, 3] .
AlFardan, Bernstein, Paterson, Poettering and Schuldt [1, 3] . The most prominent attempt at identifying all possible single-byte short-term biases in the initial keystream bytes of RC4 was recently made by AlFardan, Bernstein, Paterson, Poettering and Schuldt [1, 3] . They ran extensive experiments, using more than 2 44 random keys, to generate a list of approximately 65536 singlebyte short-term biases of RC4, including the previously known ones [6, 11, 15, 16, 22] . This search provides a comprehensive list of non-random behavior of the initial keystream bytes (bytes 1 to N = 256) of RC4 when a 16-byte key is used.
The main goal of this analysis [1] was to exploit those in a practical attack against the SSL/TLS protocol that uses RC4 for confidentiality. The authors could use all of the above-mentioned 65536 initial short-term biases of RC4 to mount a plaintext recovery attack on the SSL/TLS protocol that recovers the first 256 bytes of the plaintext from the knowledge of only 2 32 ciphertexts generated using random keys, with no prior plaintext knowledge. This attack by AlFardan, Bernstein, Paterson, Poettering and Schuldt [1] is undoubtedly the most extensive attack on any practical RC4 protocol to date, with far-reaching consequences. This attack alone is sufficient to highlight the practical importance of identifying, proving and exploiting short-term biases in RC4.
RC4 short-term landscape generated from the data of [1, 3] . The extensive experimental results by AlFardan, Bernstein, Paterson, Poettering and Schuldt [1] identified several nonrandomnesses in the short-term output keystream of RC4. Figure 2 presents a 3D model of the probabilities Pr(Z r = v) for r = 1, . . . , N and v = 0, . . . , N − 1, which we call the RC4 landscape of initial keystream bytes.
Note that this landscape is for the most practical version of RC4 that uses a 16-byte key, and is not identical for RC4 initial keystream patterns generated by secret keys of various other lengths. For example, the non-random peaks and troughs present in the 16-byte key landscape reduce to a certain extent if one uses a full length N = 256 bytes key. The visible vertical walls and spikes in Fig. 2 identify the prominent short-term bias patterns in the RC4 landscape. The main ones are for the events Z 2 = 0 (largest positive spike), Z 2 = 2 (largest negative spike), Z 1 = v where v = 0, . . . , N − 1 (sine-curve-like vertical wall on the left side), Z r = 0 (decreasing vertical wall on the right side), Z r = r (decreasing vertical wall at the center) and Z r = −r (decreasing series of spikes at the center), where r = 1, . . . , N denotes the number of the round in RC4 PRGA.
The proofs for most of these major non-random events are present in the literature. The biases in Z 2 = 0 and Z 2 = 2 have been proved by Mantin and Shamir [15] in 2001 and Sarkar [20] in 2013 respectively. The sine-curve-like pattern of Z 1 for full-length key, including the negative biases in Z 1 = 0, 1, have been proved by Sen Gupta, Maitra, Paul and Sarkar [22] in 2013, and the general proof for Z r = 0 has been done by Maitra, Paul and Sen Gupta [11] in 2011. In 2011, Sen Gupta, Maitra, Paul and Sarkar [21] proved the Z r = −r case for r = 16 (keylength), and in 2013, the general pattern for Z r = −r was partially proved by Isobe, Ohigashi, Watanabe and Morii [6] . In the same paper of 2013, Isobe, Ohigashi, Watanabe and Morii [6] proved the bias pattern for Z r = r, and the slightly weaker single-byte bias of Z 3 = 131. 
Positive (l is the keylength) [6] Open (attempted in [6] )
A consolidated account of the current state-of-the-art in terms of identified and/or proved shortterm keystream biases of RC4 is presented in Table 1 . Our motivation for this paper is to attempt proofs for all "Open" (or partially proved) problems listed in Table 1 .
Contributions of our work
We can summarize the contributions of our work as follows.
-In Section 2, we prove all open isolated short-term single-byte keystream biases reported and exploited by AlFardan, Bernstein, Paterson, Poettering and Schuldt in their recent attack [1, 3] on the SSL/TLS protocol. This includes the biases in the events Z 2 = 129, Z 2 = 172, Z 4 = 2, Z 256 = 0 and Z 257 = 0. -In Section 3, we observe that the bias of Z 1 towards 129 occurs prominently only for certain lengths of the secret key of RC4. We also discover that this bias may be related to the longstanding mysterious problem of "anomalies" in the distribution of the state array after the RC4 KSA. In this connection, we prove the anomaly in S 0 [128] = 127, a problem open for more than a decade [13] . -In Section 4, we complete the proof for the extended keylength dependent biases in RC4, i.e., biases in the events Z xl = −xl for any positive integer x and keylength l. This problem was attempted and partially solved by Isobe et al. in [6] . However, the proof was left incomplete which we settle here. Note that the particular case of x = 1 in this class of biases reduces to the keylength-dependent biases of [22] .
In this section, we prove all open isolated short-term biases of Table 1 , except the case of Z 1 = 129. The latter case is related to the "anomaly pairs" and hence we treat it separately in Section 3.
Proof of bias in (Z
We notice that the bias in (Z 2 = 129) for N = 256 is a special case of the general bias in (Z 2 = N/2 + 1) for any even value of N . We present the general result as follows.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the initial permutation S 0 of RC4 PRGA is randomly chosen from the set of all permutations of {0, 1, . . . , N −1}, where N is even. Then Pr(
Proof. We consider two mutually exclusive paths from the initial state S 0 .
From the analysis of Mantin and Shamir [15] for the bias in (Z 2 = 0), we know that Z 2 = 0 in this situation. Thus, Z 2 = N/2 + 1.
and thus S 1 [2] = N/2 + 1 and
In the second round, we get j 2 = (N/2 + 1) + X, and let us say
After the swap in the second round, we get Figure 3 illustrates the scenario. Let us denote the aforesaid mutually exclusive events as
Assuming Pr(Z 2 = N/2 + 1 | A ∧ B) ≈ 1/N , due to random association, we get the desired probability as Pr( 
Thus, in the second round, we get Figure 4 illustrates the scenario. Let us combine the aforesaid paths to obtain Pr(Z 2 = 172) as
In the above equation, computing the probability terms involving S 0 using the formula of Mantin [13] , we get Pr(Z 2 = 172) ≈ 1/N + 0.28/N 2 . Proof. We observe the main paths for this bias as follows.
We may further consider some subpaths within this case. 
Combining all the subpaths mentioned above, we get Pr(Z 4 = 2 ∧ j 4 = 4) as
Path 2. Consider j 4 = 4. Then,
, say. Here we may consider two subpaths, as follows.
-Subpath 1: 
Adding the contributions from the two mutually exclusive paths above, we get
Hence we get Pr(Z 4 = 2) ≈ 1/N + 1/N 2 . For all x = 0, we may now assume Pr(
Taking into account the contributions from all four sub-cases within this path, we get
Combining the above two paths, we get Pr(Z N = 0) as
for N = 256, as in the case with practical RC4. 
for N = 256, as in the case with practical RC4.
3 Negative bias in Z 1 = 129 and the anomaly in S 0 [128] = 127
In this section, we attempt at solving the mystery of the negative bias in Z 1 = 129, which was observed in [1, 3] , but not in [16, 22] . We first notice that the length of the secret key used in the experiments of [1, 3] was consistently l = 16, whereas the same for [16, 22] might have been different. This hinted that the bias in Z 1 = 129 may be keylength dependent. Our experiments revealed that the negative bias of Z 1 = 129 is prominent only for keylength l equal to non-trivial factors of 256, that is, for l = 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128. This behavior is depicted in Fig. 5 . Dependence of keystream biases on the secret keylength l was first proved in [22] , for any keylength l, but no such pattern for specific keylengths was discovered earlier. Our experiments with these specific keylengths l = 2, 4, . . . , 128 revealed that there exists another bias of the same kind, a negative bias in S 0 [128] = 127. Figure 6 shows the keylength dependence of this bias. This bias had been pointed out quite a few years ago [13, 18] as an "anomaly" in the otherwise smooth distribution of S 0 [u] = v, but it was never observed as a keylength dependent phenomenon.
In this section, we first settle the mysterious open issue of the S 0 [128] = 127 anomaly, and then proceed to analyze its connection with the negative bias of Z 1 = 129, if any. We will require the following technical results to prove the main theorem later.
Lemma 1. In practical RC4 with
Proof. We know that S K 0 is the identity permutation of {0, . . . , N − 1}, and thus S K 0 [r] = r. This value will remain at the same index till round (r − 1) if none of j K 1 , j K 2 , . . . , j K r−1 touches the index r, which occurs with probability (1−1/N ) r−1 , or otherwise due to random association, with probability 1/N . Hence, we get Pr( [13, 15] . Hence the "anomaly".
The theoretical results regarding the anomaly in S 0 [128] = 127, as above, closely match with the experimental results, both from our own experiments, as well as that reported in the literature [18] . This settles a long-standing mysterious issue in RC4 literature, and hints at the possibility that all "anomalies" or deviations of probabilities in the distribution of S 0 from that predicted by Mantin [13] , may actually result from intricate keylength dependence in the cipher.
Experimentally, we find that Pr( Since semitheoretical value are partially based on experimental results, we can not claim that the proof of these bias are given.
We observe that instead of following the approach of [6] , if one follows the approach in [22] , then the theoretical derivation of the generalized keylength-dependent biases become much simpler. In this section, we generalize all the keylength-dependent biases of [22] for any keylength l ∈ [3, N − 1] and any integer x ∈ [1, N l ] and thereby complete the proof of extended keylength distinguisher that was left open in [6] . As a result, the biases in [22] become special cases of our results here with x = 1. Note that though the general proof follows the same approach as in [22] , the extension is not obvious. A general proof always imply the special cases, but the converse need not be true. We experimentally verified all the intermediate claims and assumptions related to the events involving "xl" and we found them to be consistent with our theoretical claims. We present the general theorems below and present the proofs in Appendix A for the sake of completeness.
All the biases that we are interested in are related to (
, where x is an integer between 1 and N l . So we first derive the probability for this event in Lemma 3. Lemma 3. Suppose that l is the length of the secret key of RC4. Then for
Theorem 7.
Suppose that l is the length of the secret key of RC4. Then for
Theorem 8. Suppose that l is the length of the secret key of RC4. Then for Theorem 10. Suppose that l is the length of the secret key of RC4. Then for
N , where β x,l is given in Theorem 7 and δ x,l is given in Theorem 9.
Theorem 11. Suppose that l is the length of the secret key of RC4. Then for
where γ x,l is given in Theorem 8 and δ x,l is given in Theorem 9.
In Figure 7 , we compare the experimental values of (Z xl = −xl), obtained from the data of [1, 3] , with our theoretical values derived from Theorem 11, for keylength l = 16 and x = 1, 2, . . . , 15. We have obtained similar results for other keylengths as well, and some figures are in Appendix A.1. Fig. 7 . Bias in the event (Z xl = −xl) for keylength l = 16 and x = 1, 2, . . . , 15.
Conclusion
We have proved almost all open short-term single-byte biases that have been exploited in the recent TLS attack [1, 3] . We have also given complete proof of 'extended keylength biases' from [6] . Table 2 compares the experimental data of [1, 3, 6 ] to our theoretical results. We also attempted the proof of the bias in Z 1 = 129, but could not settle it completely. However, we discovered that this bias is a new 'keylength dependent' bias of RC4, which is prominent only for certain keylengths l = 2, 4, 8, . . . , 128. In the process, we tried to relate it with the long-standing open issue of 'anomalies' in RC4 initial state, and could prove an important anomaly regarding the bias in S 0 [128] = 127. Our work reveals that a thorough analysis of the "anomaly pairs" is necessary, not only for their independent theoretical interest, but also to investigate their potential implications towards keystream biases.
A Proofs of the results in Section 4
We first list some existing results that will be needed in our proofs. 
Now we present complete proofs of all the results in Section 4. Lemma 3. Suppose that l is the length of the secret key of RC4. Then for 1 ≤ x ≤ N l , we have
Proof. The major path that leads to the target event is as follows. -In round xl of the KSA, when i K xl = xl − 1, j K xl becomes −xl with probability 1 N , thereby moving −xl into index xl − 1.
-In round xl + 1 of the KSA, when
, and as discussed above, this index contains the value 0. Hence, after the swap,
Considering the above events to be independent, the probability that all of above occur together is given by α x,l =
. If the above path does not occur, then the target event happens due to random association with probability 1 N 2 , thus contributing a probability of (1 − α x,l ) 1 N 2 . Adding the two contributions, the result follows. Theorem 7. Suppose that l is the length of the secret key of RC4. Then for 1 ≤ x ≤ N l , we have
where
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 3, consider the major path with probability α x,l for the event 
Proof. From the PRGA update rule, we have j xl = j xl−1
From the proof of Lemma 3, consider the major path with probability α xl for the joint event
. This constitutes the first part of our main path leading to the target event. The second part, having probability α x,l , can be constructed as follows. u [u] = u. This happens with probability 1 − 1 N u .
-For the KSA rounds xl + 2 to u, the j K values do not touch the indices xl − 1 and xl. This happens with probability 1 − 2 N u−xl−1 .
-In round u+1 of KSA, when i K u+1 = u, j K u+1 becomes xl−1 with probability 1 N . Due to the swap, the value u moves to S K u+1 [xl − 1] and the value −xl moves to If this path does not occur, then there is always a chance of 1 N 2 for the target event to happen due to random association. Adding the two contributions, we get the result. where β x,l is given in Theorem 7 and δ x,l is given in Theorem 9.
Proof. We can write Pr(t xl = −xl) = Pr(t xl 
